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REPLY 
THE WATER WAS NOT SEVERED FROM THE LAND ON NOVEMBER 30, 1969. 
1. Respondents cannot avoid the legal effect of Section 73-1-
11 U.C.A. by claiming the water was severed from the land 
November 17, 1969. The reason for this is simple - no severance 
occurred on November 17, 1969. On November 17, 1969 title to the 
land upon which said water was being placed to use was, if 
anything, unified, not severed. It is undisputed that the land 
upon which the water was being placed to use originally belonged 
to Lorna and Clara's parents. On January 16, 1968 said land was 
conveyed to Lorna, Clara, and their three brothers and sisters 
(PI. Ex. No. 6). If the water did not pass as an appurtenance to 
this transfer of land, then the severance Respondents allege 
occurred here. Lorna and Clara's parents would then have 
retained the water - which they thereafter transferred to Lorna 
and Clara by Quit Claim Deeds on November 17, 1969. Thus, on 
November 17, 1969 Lorna and Clara's parents unified, not severed, 
the title because they reunited title to the water with the 
owners of the land upon which said water was being placed to use, 
Lorna and Clara. Thus, whether the water passed to Lorna and 
Clara as an appurtenance to the land on January 16, 1968 or by 
quit claim deeds on November 17, 1969 is somewhat irrelevant. 
The fact is, under either theory they unquestionably owned the 
water and the land upon which that water was being used as of 
November 17, 1969. Title was thus unified. Then, one month 
later, when Lorna and Clara conveyed said land, with all 
1 
appurtenances, said water passed to the grantees of those 
conveyances under statutory authority of Section 73-1-11 U.C.A. 
Each of the following facts is undisputed. Each confirms 
that title to the land and water was unified as of November 17, 
1969 - under anyone's theory of title - and that the water was 
then unquestionably appurtenant to the land and passed as an 
appurtenance to land conveyances of December 30 and 31, 1969. 
The undisputed facts are: 
a. On January 16, 1968 Lorna and Clara received by 
warranty deed the land upon which the subject water was 
being placed to use. (PI. Ex. No. 6). This transfer 
included all appurtenances and is the root title by which 
appellant claims the water and is the root title found in 
the title abstract maintained by the Utah State Engineer 
(PI. Ex. No.6). But, the Trial Court held and the Court of 
Appeals agreed that the water could not pass as an 
appurtenance to this land transfer because water does not 
become appurtenant to the land until the State Engineer 
issues his certificate of appropriation on the water so 
used. (See attached Opinion pp. 4 and 5). Under this 
theory there would have been a severance between the land 
and water titles on January 16, 1968 because the conveyance 
did not include appurtenant water. 
b. The State Engineer issued the Certificate of 
Appropriation on the contested water right October 21, 1969. 
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Because of a descriptive error said Certificate was amended 
and re-issued November 25, 1969. (PTO 111(d), FF14). 
c. Under Respondents theory of title and that accepted by 
the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, Lorna and Clara 
received the contested water right November 17, 1969 by 
virtue of two Quit Claim Deeds. (FF 15; Opinion p.5) 
Neither deed is found anywhere within the State Engineers 
files maintained for the contested water right (PTO V (2)). 
Neither is found in the State Engineers Title Abstract on 
the contested water right and they were not filed with the 
Kane County Recorder as required by 73-1-10 U.C.A. (PTO V 
(2)). Thus, for Respondents to suggest - as they do on page 
12 of their brief - that the State Engineer and respondent 
derived their chain of title in the same manner because they 
arrived at the same conclusion is blatantly misleading and 
dead wrong. It is the same as saying Highway 1-15 and 1-80 
are the same highway because they both pass through Salt 
Lake City. The State Engineer's title abstract does not 
contain Respondents root title documents and it is here that 
the highway divides between Respondents chain of title and 
the chains of Appellants and the State Engineer. The State 
Engineer's title abstract and that of Appellant are 
virtually identical. The only reason they differ is that 
the State Engineer did not have all the deeds further down 
the chain. Otherwise, the conclusions of Appellant and the 
State Engineer would unquestionably be the same. 
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d. If the land and the water titles were severed by the 
January 16, 1868 land conveyance, they were unquestionably 
unified November 17, 1968 because Lorna and Clara, the 
owners of land be virtue of the warranty deed of January 16, 
1968, received the water being used on that land by quit 
claim deeds of November 17, 1969. (FF 15; Opinion p.5). 
e. The water was actually being placed to use on the land 
held by Lorna and Clara throughout the 1969 irrigation 
season. (Tr. 42; 4. Order Amend, FF.). 
f. On December 30 and 31, 1969 Lorna and Clara joined 
their two brothers and one sister in dividing the land upon 
which the water was being used between themselves. The 
warranty deeds conveying the land included all appurtenances 
and did not reserve the water. This family distribution -
on December 30 and 31, 1969 - constitutes the basis of 
Appellant's argument that even if water did not pass as an 
appurtenance to the land until the State Engineer's 
certificate of appropriation issued, the water nevertheless 
passed as an appurtenance to the land on December 30 and 31, 
1969 because it was at that time unquestionably appurtenant 
to the land and the land was conveyed with all 
appurtenances. (Pis. Ex. D-3, D-4, and D-5). These deeds 
are conveniently omitted in Respondent's chain of title. 
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g. The only testimony of Lorna and Clara was that the deed 
of December 31, 1969 was how they thought they received 
their water and that they only received a portion of the 
water right (Tr. 127, 136), not all of it as suggested by 
Respondent and not by the quit claim deeds relied upon by 
Respondent. The remainder went to their two brothers by 
warranty deeds dated December 30, 1969. (Pis. Ex. D-3, D-4; 
Tr. 97, 100 127, 136, 161) - one of which is Appellant. 
Every party to the December 30 and 31 conveyances traced 
their claim to water through these conveyances. 
The deeds of conveyance dated December 30 and 31 are 
clear and without ambiguity. In fact, no ambiguity has ever 
been claimed. Thus, the water had to have passed under 
statutory authority 73-1-11 as an appurtenance to the land 
because there is absolutely no testimony to the contrary. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein and in Appellants Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari this Court should grant the petition. 
Respectfully submitted this ^*B day of November, 1990. 
PRUITT, GUSHEE & BACHTELL 
John W. Anderson 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Larry Little, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Greene & Weed Investments, 
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State Engineer of the State of 
Utah, 
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OPINION 
f L L J 
_
 ; AUG-J, 5 1990 
(For Publication) ^ fo? °* *• f*0'1 
Case No. 890177-CA 
Sixth District, Kane County 
The Honorable Don V. Tibbs 
Attorneys: John W. Anderson, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Larry Little 
E. J. Skeen, Salt Lake City, for Appellees Leon S. 
Lippincott and Caroline Lippincott 
Keith S. Christensen, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Greene & Weed Investments 
Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and Garff. 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Appellant appeals the trial court's decision awarding water 
rights to the appellees.1 We affirm. 
On January 16, 1968, Lester F. Little and Madge Little, 
husband and wife, conveyed to their five children by warranty 
deed 80.1 acres of land located in the Johnson Canyon area in 
1. This is an appeal from an interlocutory decree which the 
lower court certified as a final judgment pursuant to Utah R. 
Civ. P. 54(b). The lower court action was brought on two 
counts: (1) a challenge to the state engineer's decision; and 
(2) an action to quiet title to a water right. The issues below 
were bifurcated. The quiet title action was tried first since 
determination of the water right ownership will likely determine 
the challenge to the state engineer's decision. The present 
appeal concerns only the quiet title action. 
Kanab, Utah. The deed conveyed to each an undivided one-fifth 
interest M[t]ogether with all improvements and appurtenances 
appertaining thereto." At the time of the conveyance the water 
right later associated with the land had not yet been 
certificated by the state engineer. This water right was carved 
out of a larger water right application originally filed by 
Lester on April 12, 1955 and approved by the state engineer on 
October 15, 1958. On November 30, 1967, Lester filed the 
application to segregate the water right in question. The new 
application requested permission to appropriate .92 cubic feet 
per second (cfs) out of the 10 cfs in the original application 
for use on 83.3 acres. The state engineer opened a new file upon 
receiving the segregated application. 
Lester constructed diversion facilities and irrigated the 
83.3 acres beginning in the early part of 1967. On December 19, 
1967, Lester filed proof of appropriation with the state engineer 
demonstrating that the diversion facilities were complete and 
that the water had been placed to beneficial use. Approximately 
one month after filing the proof of appropriation, but prior to 
certification, Lester conveyed 80.1 of the 83.3 acres to his five 
children. 
The five children made several conveyances further dividing 
the land. Appellant contends that the initial warranty deed from 
Lester and Madge to the five children transferred the water right 
as an appurtenance to the land. Therefore, the subsequent 
warranty deeds issued by the children also passed the water 
rights, and the quitclaim deeds and other documents relied upon 
by appellees are irrelevant to the court's determination of title 
to the water. 
Appellees argue that the water rights were not conveyed in 
the warranty deeds issued by Lester and Madge. Rather, they 
argue that on November 17, 1969, Lester conveyed the entire water 
right to Lorna and Clara, two of the five children, by quitclaim 
deeds. They argue that water rights cannot be appurtenant to 
land until after the state engineer issues a certificate of 
appropriation. The trial court agreed and held that M[t]he water 
right involved . . . did not pass as an appurtenance to land 
conveyed before it was perfected by the issuance of a certificate 
of appropriation by the State Engineer.H 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Our review of the trial court's ruling is a question of law 
which we review for correctness. Asav v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135, 
1136 (Utah 1988); see Gonzales v. Morris, 610 P.2d 1285, 1286 
(Utah 1980) ("[Q]uestions of legislative intent and statutory 
application are matters of law, not of fact.M) 
Appellant argues here that the water right becomes 
appurtenant upon the filing of the proof of appropriation.2 He 
therefore contends that the water right automatically transferred 
in the warranty deed. He relies specifically on Utah Code Ann. 
§ 73-1-11 (1989) which states that "[a] right to the use of 
water appurtenant to land shall pass to the grantee of such 
land" unless expressly reserved by the grantor. He also relies 
on Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-10 (1989), which states that final water 
rights may be transferred by deed in substantially the same 
manner as real estate, and upon Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-18 (1989), 
which states that rights claimed under water right applications 
may be transferred by instruments in writing prior to issuance of 
a certificate of appropriation. 
To determine if the water right here was appurtenant to the 
land at the time of the initial conveyance, we must look to the 
nature of the right created by statute. See Bonham v. Morgan, 
788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989), reh'a denied (1990); Mosbv-
Irrigation Co. v. Criddle, 11 Utah 2d 41, 46, 354 P.2d 848, 852 
(1960). In determining the nature of this right we rely upon the 
plain language of the statutes in question and prior case law. 
Bonham, 788 P.2d at 500. In this analysis, we note that the 
right to use and appropriate water is created by statute. See 
Criddle, 11 Utah 2d at 46, 354 P.2d at 852; Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 73-3-1 to -29 (1989). The statutory procedure -prescribes the 
exclusive manner in which such a right can be initiated, the 
conditions upon which such right can be acquired, and the 
procedural requirements which must be complied with." Criddle, 
11 Utah 2d at 46, 354 P.2d at 852. 
Section 73-1-11 provides that Hwater appurtenant to land 
shall pass to the grantee of such land . . . .- The term 
-appurtenant" is not defined by statute. The Utah Supreme Court 
has stated, however, that "[a] water right, acouired by 
appropriation and used for a beneficial and necessary purpose in 
connection with a given tract of land, is an appurtenance 
thereto, and as such passes with the conveyance of the land, 
unless expressly reserved from the grant.- Thompson v. McKinnev, 
91 Utah 89, 98, 63 P.2d 1056, 1061 (1937) (emphasis added) 
2. A proof of appropriation is the next to last step in the 
statutory water appropriation process. Before a certificate of 
appropriation is issued the applicant must first file the proof 
of appropriation demonstrating that diversion facilities are 
complete and that a stated quantity of water has been applied to 
a beneficial use. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-16 (1989). 
(quoting Lensina v. Dav & Hansen Sec. Co., 67 Mont. 382, 215 P. 
999, 1000 (1923)). 
Two steps must be completed before water becomes appurtenant 
to land. First, the water must be beneficially applied to a 
specific tract of land. Thompson, 91 Utah at 97-98, 63 P.2d at 
1061. Second, all the statutory steps for appropriation must be 
completed. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-1 (1989) (no water rights 
may be appropriated without first following statutory 
requirements); Criddle, 11 Utah 2d at 46, 354 P.2d at 852; 
Thompson. 91 Utah at 98, 63 P.2d at 1061 (appropriation plus 
beneficial use equals appurtenant right); see also Eardlev v. 
Terrv, 94 Utah 367, 375, 77 P.2d 362, 365 (1938). The first step 
is completed when the proof of appropriation is filed. The 
second step, however, can only be satisfied when the entire 
statutory process is complete. Prior to completion of the entire 
appropriation process, the applicant only has an inchoate3 
right to the use of the water. See Criddle, 11 Utah 2d at 46, 
354 P.2d at 852. 
When Lester transferred the 80.1 acres to his five children 
on January 16, 1968, the final statutory requirement in the 
appropriative process, the issuance of a certificate, had not 
been accomplished. Even though Lester had previously completed 
the diversion facilities, applied the water to beneficial use, 
and filed the proof of appropriation, the water right could not 
be appurtenant to the land. The appropriation process is 
complete only after the certificate of appropriation is issued 
and that certificate then becomes -prima facie evidence- of the 
owner's water right. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-17 (1989);4 
3. The term "inchoate" means "[i]mperfect; partial; unfinished; 
begun, but not completed . . . .- Black's Law Dictionary 686 
(5th ed. 1979). 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-17 (1989) provides, in pertinent part, 
as follows: 
Upon it being made to appear to the 
satisfaction of the state engineer that an 
appropriation . . . has been perfected in 
accordance with the application therefor, 
and that the water appropriated . . . has 
been put to a beneficial use, as required 
by Section 73-3-16, he shall issue a 
certificate . . . . The certificate so 
issued and filed shall be prima facie 
evidence of the owner's right to the use 
of the water in the quantity, for the 
purpose, at the place, and during the time 
specified therein, subject to prior rights. 
Eardlev, 94 Utah at 375, 77 P.2d at 365 ("[N]o final rights are 
acquired until the proof . . . is made and a certificate has been 
issued by the state engineer."); Lake Shore Duck Club v. Lake 
View Duck Club. 50 Utah 76, 81, 166 P. 309, 311 (1917) 
(certificate is appropriator's deed of title good against the 
state and against everyone else who cannot show a superior 
right). 
We therefore conclude that the January 16, 1968 warranty 
deed did not transfer the water as an appurtenance to the land. 
The trial court properly found that the November 19, 1969 
quitclaim deed did transfer the water right at a time when that 
right was fully vested.5 
S Tl>b decision of the trial court is affirmed. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
^"Qoi^i. frfc) ^ (Xy ^ y f l
 V 7 ^ 
RufTsell W./Bench, ijudge 
«6gnalW. Garff, Judge' / 
/ / 
5. In its findings of fact, the trial court concluded that 
Lester and Madge intended to transfer the entire water right in 
the November 17, 1969 quitclaim deed, even though that deed 
contained an incorrect property description. The trial court's 
decision was based in part on a subsequent undated quitclaim 
deed and on other documents which revealed the grantors' 
intent. We find no error in the trial court's ruling. 
